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]ekyll Is and Hyde Isn't: Negotiating 
the Nationalization of Identity in 
The Mystery Garden and ^Breakfast at Tiffany's77
Sebastian Hsien-Kao Liao
The Dream of a Transparent Society
It often has been argued that the ending of Orphan of Asia 
(Yaxiya de gu}er) by Wu Zhuoliu (1977) is arbitrary because the 
tension between Hu Darning's need for a firm sense of belonging 
and his disappointment with the “motherland” experience he has 
had in Mainland China remains unresolved. Therefore, the fact 
that the novel ends with Hu returning to China to join the 
Chinese in fighting against the invading Japanese seems a bit 
forced to many. In real life, however, this might not have 
sounded so arbitrary if there had been no civil war to politically 
separate Taiwan from Mainland China. Sutured both by the 
traditional (Han) Chinese cultural identity and the identity 
provided by a stable modern Chinese nation state, the 
Taiwanese could very well have fe lt secure. And the 
“Hudamingian” confusion would have become just a curious but 
transient historical phenomenon with few consequences. But 
the civil war changed everything.
This is not to say that an identity problem had never 
surfaced in China before. But the one that is currently harrowing 
Taiwanese society assumes a “new” type of modality in the 
Chinese cultural consciousness, one that had its precedent in 
the May Fourth Movement.1 That is, it pertains to the nation 
state. Thus, to cope with this problem, new approaches have to 1
1 Prior to the Republican era, “identity disputes,” if they could be 
so called, usually centered round whether or not a given regime was 
the legitimate heir of the Daotong [the tradition of the Way]. In other 
words, it was at most a problem of the elite class, and the question was 
always this: Who among all the “Chinese contenders of legitimacy”
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be configured on the basis of an understanding of the demands 
on identity imposed by the nation state. The commonsensical 
way of dealing with this problem is to ascribe it to the fact that 
Taiwan does not have a clearly defined national identity. If this 
were the case, then, it would naturally follow that a clear 
definition of this national identity would be an apt solution to the 
problem.
But before we accept this argument, let us first pose the 
following questions: What is a nation state? What kind of 
legitimacy does it have in the contemporary world? Why has 
national identity, as it pertains to the nation state, become such 
an urgent issue in Taiwan as well as elsewhere? And finally, can 
a stable national identity actually be achieved and, if so, for what 
purpose and at whose expense?
First of all, it should be re-emphasized that even the most 
private kind of identity has always been a discursive 
construction. This is all the more so for the “national identity” of 
a modern nation state, a historical product in itself. Therefore, 
national identity has never originated deep within human nature 
but is produced by the discourse on the nation state. This 
means that, when we talk about the issue of identity, we have to 
historicize it. As Stuart Hall puts it, “[precisely because 
identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need 
to understand them as produced in specific historical and 
institutional sites within specific discursive formations and 
practices, by specific enunciative strategies" (Hall 1996: 4).
The method for acquiring (national) identity was not the 
same before the rise of the nation state as it is today; it changes 
as time goes by.2 As a result, to historicize the issue, we will 
need to ask the following questions: Why does national identity
actually had the “right identity”？ Since the Republican era, however, 
the contestation has increasingly turned into a problem for the general 
populace. More on this in note 2.
2 When Gellner discusses “high culture，” he makes an insightful 
comparison between pre-modern and modern identity formations. 
According to him, the essential difference between the two resides in 
the fact that identity formation on the basis of the possession of “high 
culture” was the exclusive right of a small elite. Even though it 
appeared authoritative to the rest of the population, it could rtot be
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come to present itself before us in its current manner? That is, 
why have we taken for granted, first, that national identity is of 
primary importance in an individual’s identity formation, and， 
second, that it has to be stable and “transparent”？
Both of these two issues have to be understood in light of 
what gave birth to the nation state—the capitalist system. 
Analyzing the relationship between capitalism and the nation 
state, Marx points out that capitalism entails “the abstraction of 
the political state." Since the latter is a corollary of the capitalist 
system, it also is based on what is fundamental to that system, 
the division of labor. Being an abstraction as well as a product 
of the principle of the division of labor, the political state would 
inevitably “demand” that its citizens’ subjectivity or identity be 
implicated in the process of abstraction and division—that is, 
one that is produced by alienation in the first place (Marx 1843: 
81).
According to Marx, the modern subject was bom from the 
nation state: the impact of capitalism on medieval society and its 
political and economic systems not only generated the political 
state (i.e_，nation state) but simultaneously “liberated” the 
“individual” （1846: 72)_ However, since this liberation of the 
individual means distributing citizenship among all its subjects, 
^citizenship" no longer implies any special status as in the pre­
modern period, but becomes an abstract identity. In other 
words，the modern notion of the “individual,” in excluding private 
life, denotes only the individual in the public sphere and 
therefore in its abstract form. This explains why the public and 
private spheres became separated in the modern nation state 
(1846: 75).
llThis [abstract] man is," Marx continues, (<the basis, the
imposed on them. Industrial societies popularized this high culture and 
forged a discourse that had to be practiced by everyone in the society 
(Gellner 1983: 50-51). The passage from the Ottoman Empire to the 
Turkish Republic fully illustrates this transformation: the empire had a 
very loose kind of identity  form ation . Some even consider it 
cosmopolitan. But ever since modern Turkey began its so-called 
“reform” based on the model of the nation state，it has adopted an 
identity policy so severe and inflexible that few authoritarian countries 
can rival it (Robin 1996; 69).
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precondition, of the political state" (1846: 77). In this system, (ta 
person’s distinct activity and distinct situation in life were 
reduced to a merely individual significance," and ltthe political 
function became the individual’s genera/ function” （1843: 166; 
emphasis mine). In other words, even though the individual was 
born together with the modern nation state, l<it is only through the 
state that individualism is possible" (Durkheim 1957: 64; qtd. 
Sayer 1991: 80). Defined and rendered abstract by the nation 
state, such a subject—one devoid of inner life—is what Marx 
calls the “modern subject■”
By now there is little doubt that the birth of this modern 
subject is closely tied to the logic of capitalism. The nation state 
transformed its subjects into abstract and empty “political men” 
or “juridical men,” with a view toward ensuring “market freedom” 
through the ''orderly oppression of law" (Sayer 1991: 83, 73). 
Such “orderly oppression of law，” according to Sayer, represents 
an attempt on the part of the nation state to suppress the private 
part of the individual in order to become a viable production unit 
that can best serve the interests of the capitalist system.
In order to be productive, the nation state has to do more 
than implement an "orderly oppression of law"; it also utilizes a 
more subtle kind of domination so that its subjects can be made 
to do things for it of their own accord. For instance, market 
freedom “rests upon a much more comprehensive moral 
regulation of social relations and identities, through a plethora of 
agencies for the reformation of character” （Corrigan and Sayer 
1985; Corrigan 1990; qtd. Sayer 1991: 73). The sort of abstract 
individualism created is also a kind of “moral individualism” 
(Sayer 1991: 80). It not only prevents the individual from 
indulging in “egoism , but exacts unprecedented “moral” 
demands on the individual (more on this later).
More importantly, what seems to be the state's domination 
is in fact also class domination.3 The institution of the modern 
nation state, itself deeply rooted in capitalism, is in fact a 
burgerliche gesellschaft formed by the bourgeoisie for its own 
benefit; this class created, and therefore is most at home in, the 
capitalist system. Consequently, the political typology of the
3 More often than not, bourgeois domination of the nation state 
involves domination with respect to gender, race and age (Sayer 1991: 
85-86).
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nation state and its class nature are two sides of the same coin, 
while the above-mentioned “abstract man” is bound to be a 
“class individual” (Sayer 1991: 69). Nevertheless, “it is precisely 
because the bourgeoisie rules as a class that in the law it must 
give itself a general expression" (Marx 1846: 329); that is to say, 
it (lmust assert itself in its external relations as nationality and 
internally must organize itself as state1' (1846: 89; emphasis 
mine). As a result, within a nation state, the subjectivity as 
manifested by the ruling bourgeoisie becomes the common 
subjectivity of everyone through the use of state apparatuses. 
That is why the bourgeoisie could proclaim that "the nation state 
itself becomes the embodiment of the 'society' and the new 
basis of the individuals1 public identities." Since it “claims to 
embrace all,” it follows that it also “claims the lives and loyalties 
of all” （Sayer 1991:75-76).
Thus far, we have come to a preliminary understanding of 
the symbiotic relationship between the nation state and 
capitalism, as well as the fact that the nation state is in fact 
dominated by the bourgeoisie. But then, how does the 
bourgeoisie ensure its domination? Or, to put it another way, 
how does it make the subjects feel that the “national identity” 
that it provides is necessarily their primary identity? Ernest 
Gellner’s analysis of nationalism argues strongly that it is 
through nationalism and its corollary, what we mentioned earlier 
as “moral individualism,” that it does so.
According to Gellner, the identity offered by the nation 
state is rooted in nationalism, which in turn is based on a certain 
division of labor; it is a new type of “culture” bom from “industrial 
society” （GellneM983: 24). The purpose of this “culture” is to 
satisfy the demands of an industrial society because this society 
is “the only society ever to live on sustained and perpetual 
growth” （1983: 22). In order to keep pace with its great 
economic growth, it can no longer function according to the strict 
hierarchical social system typical of an “agrarian society”； it has 
to achieve a certain degree of mobility and egalitarianism, 
characteristics that would facilitate the supply of labor which is 
“instrumental, optional，and renewable” （1983: 24-25). To 
ensure this, an industrial society must provide its citizens with a 
universal education which is “generic and standardized,” 
enabling them not only to become highly mobile and re­
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trainable，but to “communicate” and “exchange meaning” with 
ease (1983: 27-35).
Nationalism is central to the production of this kind of 
labor. That is why Gellner argues that, “contrary to popular and 
even scholarly belief, nationalism does not have any very deep 
roots in the human psyche” but instead is coterminous with “a 
kind of now pervasive social order" (1983: 34). Gellner calls this 
social order "universal high culture," literate and training- 
sustained, as opposed to the "folk culture" of agrarian societies: 
of these two cultures, the latter is transmitted orally and the 
former is sustained through universal education and the mass 
media. Universal high culture thus replaced “king，land，or 
religious faith” as the new object of loyalty for the “modem man.” 
The fact that Adam Smith calls the nation state the “Mortall God” 
while Weber calls it the ^nation-church-state" underscores this 
point.4 Obviously “allegiance to culture” is synonymous with 
“allegiance to the nation state，’’ and “high culture” is closely tied 
to, and shaped by, the nation state (1983: 36-38). This is where 
the power of the nation state lies: through high culture, it 
repeatedly claims to be able to “represent essential components 
of individual identities, to epitomize who we are" (Corrigan and 
Sayer 1985; qtd. Sayer 1991: 82).
The real, or at least the major, intent of nationalism has 
been all but laid bare: in order to maintain perpetual growth, an 
industrial society manufactures high culture and the members of 
the society ((breathe, live and produce in i f  (emphasis mine) 
(Gellner 1983: 37-38). In a word, the nation state disseminates 
nationalism through “culture”—in fact we can even say that the 
cultural intent of a nation state is to disseminate nationalism— 
and its subjects are made to accept the national identity supplied 
by the bourgeoisie as their primary identity. This is tantamount 
to a collective unconscious which can secure the bourgeois 
domination of the nation state and, consequently, perpetual 
growth. While, with his oft-quoted theory of “imagined 
communities," Anderson indeed goes further than Gellner in his
4 In traditional societies, an allegiance to culture was not 
uncommon. But since high culture was usually transmitted through 
narrow channels and to a rather small group of elites, only the elites 
would pledge strong allegiance.
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analysis of how the nation state manufactures ^culture/' 
especially with regard to “print capitalism,” he does so in a 
basically phenomenological manner and ignores the crucial 
relationship, as outlined above, between the nation state and 
capitalism (Anderson 1991).
To understand how the bourgeoisie-dominated nation state 
ensures that its subjects succumb to the beckoning of 
nationalism and then willingly pledge loyalty and help maintain 
constant economic production, we need to refer to Foucault’s 
discussion of “governm entality.” It is by implementing 
“governmentality” that the nation state is able to monitor its 
subjects down to the smallest detail and make sure they will fulfil 
the demands nationalism imposes on them. According to 
Foucault, before modernity came into existence, the civic-legal 
(i.e., public) and spiritual (i.e., private) spheres of Western 
society were governed, respectively, by politics and religion. But 
since the sixteenth century, the modern government—or nation 
state一of Western society began to merge the “city game” and 
the “shepherd game” and form a “secular political pastorate” or 
“police state，’’ turning “individualization” and “totalization” into 
two sides of the same coin. Such a government claims to be ltof 
all and of each" (Burchell et al. 1991: 8-12). At first glance, it 
seems that it does so because it believes it can take better care 
of the people by "[enabling] every subject to have an 
‘economically’ useful life” （1991: 12), but in fact it aims more to 
expand the power of state apparatuses. While the separation of 
the public and private spheres by the bourgeoisie-dominated 
nation state does not necessarily have only negative 
consequences，the “police state” was nevertheless definitely 
moving in the direction of minimizing and even eliminating the 
private sphere of the individual.
The police state not only instituted surveillance over the 
"conduct" of its subjects, but also unrelentingly encouraged them 
to live an “economically useful life.” This then developed into the 
mentality of “panopticon,” seeking perfect, one hundred percent 
control (Burchell al. 1991: 25). This is what Foucault means 
when he speaks of the dream of a transparent society created 
through "techniques of surveillance, a pastoral concern with the 
capacities of a population, and the force of public opinion” 
(Donald 1996: 181). In such a society, the subjects become
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servants to the state: they have to be ready to sacrifice 
themselves for the state. Even though capitalism eventually 
forsook the covert project of complete “statization” or state 
control, it nevertheless delegates power to private institutions 
which disseminate power through less conspicuous means 
(such as popular culture) and are often able to actually conceal 
or naturalize the fact of domination (Burchell et al. 1991: 25-27). 
This is what Baudrillard refers to as “simulacrum,” the form of 
seamless cultural control in late capitalist society. Theoretically, 
the main difference between modem identity and pre-modern 
identity is that the hereditary nature of the latter has been 
transformed into the free choice of the former. But, in fact, in a 
nation state-dominated modern world, people living in a given 
society have little choice in their adoption of a national identity, 
since the concept of citizenship seems to stipulate that, while 
one is apparently allowed to choose, one must always make 1(the 
right choice" (Zizek 1989: 165-66).
The foregoing discussion has revealed that the severe 
demand of the nation state—that national identity be primary 
and transparent—is a product of specific historical conditions 
involving the domination of capitalism and the bourgeoisie. The 
nation state does not have enough legitimacy to make such a 
demand, nor can it fully disguise the fact that, in actuality, this is 
a system of domination. To put it in more radical terms, it does 
not have absolute universality. Even though Gellner has pointed 
out that the nation state is an institution that arose in response to 
an industrial society’s demand for “perpetual growth,” it does not 
necessarily follow that any society that plans to industrialize has 
to incorporate this institution in a wholesale manner.
During the encounter of cultures, it often was the case that 
the industrialized West，considering itself “more civilized，’’ forced 
its institution of the nation state upon non-Western, traditional 
societies by means of its superior weaponry (Appadurai 1996: 
141-42). At the same time, the non-Western societies were also 
goaded into believing that, for the sole reason of technological 
backwardness, they were obliged to abandon their traditional 
values altogether and eventually enter the trap of “[dying] 
precisely in the manner the West wants it to die” （Gourgouris 
1996: 61). But in fact the grand wish on the part of these 
societies to be reborn through the institution of the nation state
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was not fulfilled, because of the destruction of their traditions; 
this is a fact that unwittingly exposed the defects of the 
institution (Robins 1996). Certainly, the advent of the age of 
globalization also has permitted us a better understanding of the 
symbiotic relationship between the ^national longing" and the 
“consumerist aesthetics” of capitalism, that is，the hyperreal 
nature of the nation state (Luke 1995: 94).
In view of the fact that the nation state will be here to stay 
for quite a while, how are we to make the most of a deeper 
understanding of this institution so as to minimize its negative 
effects, such as capitalist exploitation, class domination, 
communal conflicts, and gender and age discrimination? In fact, 
the answer is very simple. It is imperative that we de-prioritize 
and de-transparentize national identity. The actual 
implementation of these two measures requires a complete 
grasp of the expediency of both the “form” and “content” （in the 
Zizekian sense) of the identity provided by the nation state. The 
fact that the foregoing genealogical study of identity formation in 
the nation state has excavated the historicity of its "form" should 
be evidence strong enough to exert a de-mythifying effect on the 
assumption that the longing for a national identity is rooted in 
human nature，and hence to de-prioritize such an identity. But 
the "content" of national identity, which, being totemized, has led 
to the desire for its transparency, awaits further interrogation.
The work of llde-transparentization>, must proceed from the 
recognition of the subject as “void” or “empty.” But this implies 
an awareness of the subject's radical emptiness instead of a 
practice of actually emptying it out, an awareness that any 
content of an identity derives from discursive constructions and 
hence is historically situated, changing with time. On the other 
hand, it should also be recognized that this subject is also 
“constitutively antagonistic” or “lacking” （乏i之ek 1989: 124-27) and 
therefore does not have an a priori unity. This is as true with 
individual subjects as with the subject of a democratic institution. 
Nevertheless, understanding the subject as having no fix(at)ed 
or unified content exemplifies only the passive meaning of the 
notion of “subject as void.” Its positive meaning can be seen in 
the fact that only through the notion of an abstract subject 
located in the symbolic order can we recognize, in the light of 
the Law, the injustice of all the various kinds of “imaginary
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identifications" occupying the collective subject positions. Only 
on the basis of this recognition can we protect our own interests 
and ensure our right to become a unique individual, to the same 
extent that others have protected and ensured theirs (Donald 
1996: 175). This is the only path to radical democracy.5
But to resist the hegemony of Imaginary identifications'1 by 
means of the voidness of the subject is not tantamount to saying 
that in daily life, we are to discard our “emotions” （what 乏i2ek 
after Lacan, calls jouissance). Identity formation necessarily 
involves both “emotional attachments” and “practical concerns” 
which are inextricably intertwined (Smith 1997; 66-69; Liao 
Hsien-hao 1995; Appardurai 1996). Moreover, our daily practice 
actually relies on the filling in of the void of our subjectivity. 
Without the emotional part, the subject would not even exist, 
since this part is the positive condition of the void subject: “by 
losing the material support, the very form dissolves itself (Zizek 
1991: 165); demanding absolute rationality would in the end 
produce the monster of the “pure subject of Enlightenment” 
(Zizek 1992: 134-36). That explains why Lacan insists on the 
importance of the concept of sinthome: the part of us that is not 
accountable by rationality is in fact "the only support of beingJ, 
(Zizek 1989: 75).6 Therefore, the "voidness of the subject" does 
not imply that the subject works in emptiness; it underscores an 
awareness of the expediency of the content of all subjectivities. 
However, since the accretion of emotions is the only way in 
which the subject expresses its subjectivity, it can understand 
the dialectical relationship between past and future from the
5 Superficially, Zizek's blank subject seems no different from the 
abstract bourgeois subject. In fact, as its bourgeois origin makes clear, 
the “abstract” citizen，far itom being “blank，” always already has 
assumed a class content, which in turn is accompanied by other 
content elements such as gender, race, ethnicity and age.
6 My prolonged debate with Chaoyang Liao centered round the 
issue of whether the void or blank could allow for the existence of 
emotions. Chaoyang Liao’s argument was supposedly based on 
乏 i之ek’s adaptation of the Lacanian conception of subjectivity as void. 
But in fact what he tried to defend was transparency rather than 
voidness. See Liao Chaoyang (1995a; 1995b; 1995c; 1996a; 1996b) 
and Liao Hsien-hao (1995a; 1995b; 1996a; 1996b).
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conflict between rationality and emotion. At the same time, the 
subject can learn to respect others’ emotions (Donald 1996: 
188). All communities and individuals could (and could only) fill 
in the voidness with their own emotional accretions; they should 
by no means be prevented from doing so. According to Donald, 
“[one’s] enactments of citizenship embody the different ways of 
experiencing the impossibility of identity" (Donald 1996: 186).7
One word of caution, though. The fact that Zizek links 
“emotion” with “nation” might mislead us into thinking that 
“emotion” takes a singular rather than plural form. If that were 
the case, then "nation" would not be the support of identity but 
its “content,” because the subject of “nation” （that is, citizenship) 
would no longer remain “empty•” How then would it be different 
from the usual form of nationalism, which always acknowledges 
only one kind of emotion for the nation as legitimate?之i之ek’s 
concept of “nation，” defined as the Lacanian Das Ding，that is, “a 
traumatic real object fixing our desire" (Zizek 1991:162), in fact 
refers to the impossible enjoyment of the nation state, one that 
cannot be crystallized into a coherent object and thus remains 
beyond the organization of the symbolic but also supports this 
same organization. In other words, since a state by nature 
contains more than one community and should be ready to 
accept as valid all the different emotional matrices these 
communities employ to support their citizenship, the praxis of 
citizenship inevitably produces differences. In this light, 
according to Donald，even Habermas’s notion of a “post- 
traditional” cultural identity remains still on the level of “content” 
and does not meet the criterion of real, democratic thinking 
about identity (Donald 1996: 173-75).
But a nation state demands transparency of identity 
precisely because it does not admit that its subjects have 
emotions (or jouissance). In other words, nationalism's ultimate 
desire is to absolutize or essentialize the content which it has 
filled in the empty citizenship. Put in a different way, it
7 We need to communicate and negotiate precisely because our 
emotions are directed toward different objects. Or, in Zizek's words, 
we have our own enjoyment. The purpose of communication and 
negotiation resides in advising the parties involved to give up the 
impulse to completely fill in one's emotions in the empty subject.
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legitimizes or “Jekyllizes” the emotions of only a part of the 
people of the state. The consequence of this is bound to be that 
emotions of other kinds will be depreciated or suppressed and, 
having no legitimate outlets, will eventually reappear in the form 
of the “return of the repressed,” what Donald calls the “Hyde” 
phenomenon (Donald 1996: 188). Zizek is even more direct: "All 
attempts to fill out democracy with ‘concrete contents’ succumb 
sooner or later to the totalitarian temptation, however sincere 
their motives may be" (Zizek 1991: 163-64). Lacan goes even 
further in imagining the worst case scenario: "I love you, but 
there is in you something more than you, objet petit a, which is 
why I mutilate you” （Lacan 1978: 263)_
But the above-mentioned exclusionary "primordial 
sentiments” that characterize nationalism do not belong only to 
“backward” or “uncivilized” communities (such as tribal peoples 
or underdeveloped non-Western societies). Despite their 
apparent spontaneity, emotions are “acquired” through learning 
(Appadurai 1996: 147). The “primordial sentiments” said to 
permeate primitive societies are even more obviously llclose to 
the center of the project of modern nation state" (Appadurai 
1996: 146). In other words, the nation state is more of a 
manufacturer of these kinds of sentiments than so-called 
primitive societies: it makes use of state apparatuses and the 
media (especially the latter) to consistently chum out “emotions” 
and seduce its subjects into identifying with them and 
internalizing them. The purpose of doing so is nothing other 
than to “suppress internal dissent, to construct homogeneous 
subjects of the state, and to maximize the surveillance and 
control of the diverse populations under their control” （Appadurai 
1996: 146). Communal conflicts occur often because large- 
scale identities), have been "convincingly portrayed as primary 
(indeed even as primordial) loyalties by politicians, religious 
leaders, and the media" (emphasis mine). The consequence is 
that ordinary people would 1(self-fulfillingly seem to act as if only 
this kind of identity mattered and as if they were surrounded by a 
world of pretenders” （1996: 155). This is what Appadurai 
postulates as the “treachery hypothesis，” which describes an 
untrusting attitude toward the “aliens” living next door，one that 
eventually may lead to a “sense of betrayal” since the 
“transparency” of one’s identity investment is ultimately
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impossible. History has made it clear that if this "sense of 
betrayal" is relentlessly aggravated by politicians, it would not be 
long before these “aliens” are “slaughtered” because there are 
always any number of ways ready at hand for the “natives” to 
prove that these “aliens” have that “something in them more 
than them" (1996: 154).
The foregoing discussion has amply demonstrated how 
imperative it is that we “de-primarize” and “de-transparentize” 
the identity offered by the institution of the nation state. Then, 
the so-called identity problem troubling Taiwanese society will no 
longer be “What kind of nation is Taiwan?” （Does Taiwan have 
an unclear national status?), but llWhat kind of nation (society) 
do the Taiwanese want?” （Do we consent to the “primarization” 
and Htransparentization" of national identity in our neglect of the 
problems of corporate exploitation, organized crime, communal 
conflicts, class domination, gender domination, and so on?) If 
we insist on pursuing the dream of a “transparent society” 
conceived by the nation state, it will be difficult to measure how 
much our social capital would be squandered. On the other 
hand, only by imagining a kind of “open nation”一one that allows 
us to have a genuine “multicultural society”一and by interpreting 
and re-inventing Taiwan more creatively can we dissipate the 
imagined urgency of the identity problem (Liao Hsien-hao 1999) 
and shake off the nationalist shackles on cultural development 
that this problem imposes.
The Abdication of the Mistress of the Estate: 
Woman and National Identity
There is no dearth of modern Taiwanese fictional works 
that deal with the issue of identity. Despite this obsession with 
national identity, however, reflections on the nature of the nation 
state as a discourse have been seriously lacking. Most of them 
cannot find an alternative to falling back on the notion of the 
"nation state" as a "final solution." It is as if the longing for a 
nation state is innate in human nature rather than the product of 
a mode of production. While there have been debates over 
national identity, as well as its nature as a product of discourse, 
those who participated in the debates (whether they be in favor 
or against, left wing or right wing) have only been engaged in
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relatively crude affirmations or denunciations of the nation state, 
failing to offer a historicized critique of the nation state as a 
discourse.8 Fortunately, in the last few years some works seem 
to have offered some incipient possibilities.
In the following discussion, I will employ two fictional 
works—The Mystery Garden (Mi yuan, 1991), a novel by Li Ang, 
and "Breakfast at Tiffany's" (Difan}nei zaocan, 1997), a short 
story by Zhu Tianxin—to illustrate this new development in 
critical thinking on national identity in contemporary fictional 
writing. What is worth noting is that, although the two works 
presumably come from opposing camps, they seem to agree 
with each other in many ways. And it is in the convergence of 
their thinking that we can most likely see hope for the future of 
Taiwanese society.
Li Ang's The Mystery Garden has two parallel plots: one 
concerns the sexual desire of Zhu Yinghong, the daughter of a 
rich family in Lugang, one of the oldest townships in Taiwan; the 
other concerns her father, who sustained political persecution by 
the KMT and died with his dreams unfulfilled. The relationship 
between these two plots has been the focus of much critical 
discussion. Some critics believe that the two lines of 
development remain unintegrated (Jin 1993; Huang 1993). A 
major reason for this argument is that the author's political 
position—Li Ang is known to be a fervent supporter of Taiwan 
independence—seems to be contradicted by her sympathy for 
repressed female sexual desire (Huang 1993). Indeed, one of 
the emphases of this novel is on the issue of national identity. Li 
Ang’s anti-Chinese political stance also leaves little room for 
doubt as to her political allegiance. 丫et the author’s feminist 
position is just as central to the novel. Hence, what remains to 
be done is to devise some way of bridging the two positions.
The two lines of development concern Zhu Yinghong’s 
respective relations with the two most important men in her life: 
her father and her lover Lin Xigeng. These two lines run parallel 
to each other, one concerning the sad failure of a (Taiwanese) 
nationalist attempt to build a nation state and the other a story of 
unrequited love. But in fact, they often refer to each other and
8 In my debate with Chaoyang Liao, this was one of the major 
points I was trying to illustrate, which to my knowledge had never been 
put forward before in Taiwan.
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are mutually implicated, as we can easily tell from the 
juxtaposition of the two men whenever they are placed in similar 
situations. Zhu’s father and Lin Xigeng share some important 
qualities. Even Zhu’s love-at-first-sight experience with Lin could 
be understood as triggered by Zhu's discovering, or, more 
precisely, imagining to have discovered, qualities that her father 
lacks, or could have had but were prematurely repressed by 
political persecution.
In fact，Zhu Yinghong’s choice of a lover is influenced by 
her father in two opposing respects: she looks for someone who 
is similar to her father yet complements him in significant ways. 
Having learned from her father that he had had great and noble 
ambitions, which were left unfulfilled due to political persecution, 
causing him to idle away his life in Han Garden, Zhu vows to 
realize her father’s dream. For her, this means marrying 
someone who has the ability to complete the unfinished task her 
father started. At first sight, Lin does seem to meet her 
requirements. In his handsome looks and the patriarchal 
(masculine) authority that he exudes, he is like her father. Once 
the connection between the two men is unveiled, it is quite 
obvious that the relationship between Zhu and Lin is more than 
just an erotic one. It reads more like an allegory about the 
political status of "Taiwan." The question is: What precisely is its 
allegorical meaning?
We have to begin by exploring the allegorical meaning of 
the relationship between Zhu Yinghong and her father. The 
latter at first plans to build a high school for the purpose of 
inculcating in the Taiwanese people enlightened, modern 
knowledge. But after the political persecution of the KMT, a 
Chinese (and thus, for him, a non-Taiwanese) regime, he comes 
to believe in the necessity of “constructing” a “native culture,” 
even though he fears the opportune moment has passed him by. 
From his personal history, we learn that his cultural-nationalist 
dream is rooted in a worship of Enlightenment thinking not 
uncommon in his time, which has as its ultimate realization the 
establishment of a nation state. When political reality makes it 
impossible for this dream to be actualized, Zhu's father turns to 
Han Garden as a surrogate locale where he can comfort himself 
with a miniaturized, imaginary nation state.
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Although Zhu’s father is far from strict and 
uncompromising_ in a way that one may be tempted to picture 
traditional Chinese fathers—his relationship with his daughter is 
nevertheless built upon a code of obedience (“[she was] always 
taught to obey her father unconditionally" [Li 1991: 147]). 
Therefore, although Zhu Yinghong has taken it upon herself to 
carry on her father’s unfinished attempt to construct a dignified 
identity related to the creation of a nation state for the 
Taiwanese, she is nevertheless constrained by the traditional 
(both Chinese and Japanese) as well as bourgeois roles of a 
woman (“[I was] bom at the end of last century” [1991: 18]), 
which require her to be deferential and discreet in the presence 
of men. In sexual terms, she has always been trained, and feels 
compelled, to desire a masculine man, someone who could help 
complete her father's incomplete project.
Judging from Lin Xigeng’s looks, he does satisfy the terms 
that Zhu Yinghong—or rather, nationalism—has set up for the 
national father: he is tall and handsome, ambitious and full of 
energy, authoritarian and entrepreneurial. All these combine to 
create an image of the founding father of a nation state. To a 
great extent, too, he is actually representative of the age he lives 
in, when Taiwan was beginning to make its presence felt in the 
international business arena and building its foundation as an 
independent nation state. Besides, marriage between a man 
like Lin, who is from the countryside of Taiwan, vibrant and 
energetic, and a woman like Zhu, the well-educated and 
beautiful daughter of a rich and established family from a 
culturally sophisticated old city in Taiwan, is keenly reminiscent 
of the prototype of the founding marriage of all nationalist myths. 
There seems to be no reason for a Taiwanese not to shower it 
with blessings.
But Li Ang has seen through the fog of the nationalist myth 
(one espoused by both nationalist camps: the pre-Li Denghui 
KMT and the present ruling party, DPP) and hit it in its most 
vulnerable spot. The two occasions, on which Zhu Yinghong 
first unleashes her libidinal energy on Lin and then falls 
helplessly in love with him, are described as taking place in 
kitschy singing salons where businessmen strike their business 
deals. Presumably for a well-educated woman like Zhu, these 
are not the best venues in which to fall in love. In particular, Zhu
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becomes immersed in the virtual reality conjured up by the 
sentimental pop songs and becomes helplessly infatuated with 
Lin. Such melodramatic falling in love is not something that 
happens to Zhu alone.9 But the fact that her “love” for Lin is 
spurred on by pop songs fully underscores the way in which her 
erotic desire has been manipulated by the hyperreality 
fabricated by the media and technology of the capitalist system. 
The fact that the author purposely arranges for the rendezvous 
which seals their love to take place on a plot of land where Lin is 
going to build a housing complex lends further support to such a 
reading. At the point when she is totally aroused by Lin’s 
caresses, Zhu raises her head in anticipation of full 
consummation of their love, only to find him ^indifferent and 
without desire” （1991: 183). Obviously he is doing it not out of 
“reallove，” but merely by the book. Everything about their 
relationship turns out to have been executed within the circuit of 
a bourgeois discourse of love a la Taiwanese.
In other words, the foregoing incident virtually epitomizes 
how the capitalist principle of commodification has always 
already reduced “sacred love” （if it ever existed) to a vulgar myth 
of love. More importantly, insofar as love is an allegory for 
nation-building in this book, the above revelation about love has 
also exposed the “sacred” content of nationalism to be the 
material desires of capitalism, which is intent on ravaging the 
land of Taiwan. Not only is Zhu Yinghong here made a symbol 
of the land being ravished, but elsewhere in this story the land 
itself is also compared to a supple woman waiting to be ravished 
(see 1991: 229). Thus, the institution of the nation state is 
nothing but an extended claw of global capitalism reaching deep 
into the private areas of Taiwan. Only on such a premise can 
the erotic relationship between Lin and Zhu be construed as one 
between the colonizer and the colonized. And only through this 
perspective can we grasp the theme of this book.10
9 Prousfs Remebrance o f Things Past and Kundera's The 
Unbearable Lightness o f Being, for example, are among the most 
outstanding literary works in which love is described as having arisen 
from the workings of the imagination.
10 Xiaoyan Peng has interpreted the erotic relationship between 
Zhu Yinghong and Lin Xigeng as “colonial.” However, unless we
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While Zhu Yinghong is still entrapped in the bourgeois love 
discourse, she hopes she can be married to Lin in a 
conventional way, live an honest marital life, and eventually have 
kids. During this period, she is almost completely her father’s 
(that is, nationalism’s) girl，doing everything in her father’s name 
and for her father's sake. But despite the power of patriarchal 
discourse as aided by capitalist commodification, her female 
perspective enables her to maintain an excess of 
consciousness, which eludes co-optation by the patriarchal traps 
set up by the bourgeois love discourse. She knows deep down 
that she doesn't really want to accept the role assigned to her 
under the bourgeois value system: “There’s still a crystalline and 
sober me that hides somewhere in me which says clearly and 
irrefutably: This is definitely what I want to do” （1991: 283).
This is the voice that comes out of her deeper self even as 
she, being pregnant, is waiting for a firmer and clearer 
commitment from Lin. Upon hearing this voice, Zhu makes up 
her mind to be freed from the influences of hyperreality—the 
discourses of love and of the nation state in which her “love” for 
Lin originated—influences of which she is not unaware but which 
have been exerted upon her ever since she fell in love with Lin. 
She has an abortion. While she used to think that the perfect 
combination of Lin's untamed vitality and her refined upbringing 
would result in the birth of a new Taiwanese, one who would be 
the new master of Han Garden, she eventually realizes that 
everything about their love affair so far has been closely tailored 
to fit what Baudrillard calls the ^models" of capitalism. The way 
she captures Lin is but an old-fashioned man-hunt game of a 
patriarchal society and one which involves no “rea llove .” 
Therefore their baby pulsates with no real life.
Only after Zhu has had the abortion does she affirm her 
status as an independent woman. The necessity of taking this
understand the word “colonial” in terms of the complicitous relationship 
between the nation state and capitalism, it makes little sense to 
interpret the actions of a Taiwanese who “strives to establish the 
national dignity of the Taiwanese” as an attempt at “colonizing” another 
Taiwanese. The prevailing practice in Taiwan and elsewhere of 
describing the relations of domination between classes and sexes as 
“colonial” confuses rather than clarifies. See Liao (1999).
Jekyll Is and Hyde Isn't 83
step not only signifies an implacable conflict between an 
independent female subjectivity and the male-dominated 
institution of the nation state, but also seems to imply that there 
is some kind of fatalistic contradiction inherent in Taiwanese 
cultural nationalism—that is, a contradiction between Zhu Feng 
(the ancestor of the Zhu family which symbolizes the legacy of 
sea pirates or economical adventurousness) and Madame Chen 
(the wife of Zhu Feng who represents the impulse toward 
cultural consolidation). Looking at Taiwan from the perspective 
of this novel, this indeed seems to be the case. Zhu Yinghong 
and Lin Xigeng seem to be contemporary incarnations of these 
two mythic ancestors of Han Garden/ Taiwan. The seafaring 
pirate and the home-loving Madame had a ferocious 
confrontation three hundred years ago and this conflict is not 
mitigated a bit in our time; if anything, it has worsened. This is, 
however, a fact which few Taiwanese nationalists notice, except 
Li Ang.
In order to rescue Han Garden, Zhu’s first vision is to try to 
marry Lin. But the fact that no offspring comes from their 
marriage signals the futility of her project. Lin’s vitality now has 
been completely emptied out by capitalism, as he admits when 
speaking about his virility: “I’m no longer as good as before” 
(1991: 183). Worse still, he has become nothing but a 
henchman of capitalism. As a result, their marriage has 
ironically created a fatal threat to Han Garden, which eventually 
leads to Zhu’s decision to donate it:
uWhat would happen to this garden if one day I'm deprived of the 
title of Mrs. L in ..
He obviously understood what she meant, but chose to 
ignore it: “Perhaps I would tear down everything and build an 
apartment complex on it if the price is good?" (Li 310)
It seems as if they were talking about the possibility of their 
marriage running aground one day. But ironically, by changing 
his subject, Lin hits right on target. With or without a divorce, 
Han Garden is doomed now that one of Lin’s feet is inside the 
door; Lin can enter the garden any time he wants, whether he is 
Zhu’s husband or ex-husband.
At first sight, the symbolic meaning of Han Garden seems
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rather clear: it is symbolizes Taiwan. But how it does so merits 
closer examination. Vis-a-vis Lin the henchman, it symbolizes 
the land (connoting nature); at the same time, though, it is also a 
cultural project. Having adopted the three hundred-year-old 
legacy of Madame Chen, Han Garden represents an effort to 
take root. The thing is, this effort has not even succeeded at as 
recent a time as that of Zhu's father. On the other hand, since 
this effort to take root is a cultural project, it is also constantly 
under the threat of “nature”； any slight negligence might allow 
wild nature in the garden to swallow up everything humanistic. 
This is why this peasant boy is chosen by Zhu because Han 
Garden as a cultural project needs someone who knows the soil 
and has more vitality.
But, to her dismay, Lin is still the pirate who appeared 
three hundred years ago; he is both ignorant about culture and 
lacks the stamina of a cultural hero. All he is interested in is 
pillaging and p lu nde ring .巳ecause he is a pirate, he is so 
compatible with the capitalist spirit that he himself becomes a 
threat to the cultural project. That is why Zhu decides to let the 
curse of Madame Chen on the Zhu family be fulfilled: “the Zhu’s 
family line will be extinguished and the garden donated” 
because Zhu would rather do that than let Lin ravage the garden 
through land speculation. In other words, in order not to let the 
bourgeois institution of the nation state exploit the garden in the 
name of the “nation，” Li Ang would rather bring to an end the 
project of nation-building, which Zhu's father had held to be his 
life-long goal.
But we are not saying that Li Ang is therefore no longer 
attached to Han Garden. Her feelings for the garden are fully 
revealed in the last scene where Zhu looks back at the garden 
and sees an illusory vision of the garden in flames. But she is 
fully aware that her father’s project of modernization/ nativization 
(i.e., lighting up the garden with fluorescent lights; archiving the 
garden with German-made cameras) has always already turned 
the garden into a fetish in the capitalist system. Nevertheless, 
this does not have to mean the end of the garden. Donating the 
garden may eventually prove to be a turning point, since it will 
be in the hands of the “people” now and no longer tied to the 
project of the state. Thus, donating the garden signifies a strong 
desire to escape from further commodification as well as the
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potential for one to become a tool for the nation state. Even 
though Zhu is strongly attached to the land, she is not obliged to 
embrace the male-dominated, bourgeois institution of the nation 
state: "Therefore I want this garden to belong to Taiwan, to its 
population of twenty million and not to any oppressive 
government” （1991: 306-7). Han Garden may still stand a 
chance, but whatever ideals it signifies do not necessarily have 
to—they had better not, according to the book—be realized 
through the nation state.
The Revenge of the Female Slave:
The “New Human Being” and National Identity
Whereas The Mystery Garden depicts the alienation of an 
old-fashioned Taiwanese from the (Taiwanese) nationalist 
establishment, “Breakfast at Tiffany’s” looks at how a “new 
human being" (xinrenlei) resists the bourgeois nation state. The 
story depicts a young woman who has read widely in social 
theories by people like Marx and participated in radical social 
movements. But she wallows, too, in the dream of buying a 
diamond for herself. In allowing this dream to unfold itself, she 
examines, with evident irony, how bourgeois society incessantly 
exploits “the people”一and how social movements and cultural 
criticism indirectly aggravate this exploitation. More ironically, 
buying a diamond has somehow become the means whereby 
she derives her hard-won independence as a subject.
At first sight, this story looks like a direct indictment of 
society, but when the female protagonist’s attempt to purchase a 
diamond is introduced and made the central plot line of the story, 
it begins to exude some kind of "uncanny" flavor. On the one 
hand, she consistently interlaces the narrative with all manner of 
leftwing discourses. This indicates that she is highly aware of 
modern man’s “universal dependency” on institutions when he 
lives in a capitalist society (Sayer 1991: 61). But, on the other 
hand, she obviously seems to have deviated from the ideals she 
held very dearly as a student activist. In being absorbed in the 
project of buying a diamond to satisfy an unknown desire in 
herself, she seems to have totally succumbed to the 
consumerist aesthetic of capitalism.
Such apparently contradictory perspectives, however,
新人類
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come to co-exist in the protagonist for a reason. In fact, the 
leftwing discourses have not at all lost their explanatory power 
for her. On the contrary, her newly found passion for 
consumerism is brought about by the powerful insights which 
these discourses have proffered her and which the society at 
large is doing everything it can to downplay. Precisely because 
she has thoroughly embraced these radical ideas, she can 
question what her fellow radical activists (including her ex-boy 
friend Xiao Ma) have done, for they have mostly abandoned 
their former beliefs and are now devoting most of their energy to 
the nationalist cause instead. As nationalism is, by definition, 
bourgeois nationalism, it would not come as a surprise if these 
social activists-turned-nationalists now hold an abstract rather 
than a concrete idea of “the people,” one inherent in the trinity of 
the bourgeoisie, capitalism and the nation state. In other words, 
since the Taiwanese “democratic movement,” which has come to 
be totally dominated by the Taiwanese nationalists, has 
consistently espoused as its ultimate goal the establishment of a 
new nation state, and has now been steeped in the consumerist 
aesthetic of capitalism, it is difficult for its supporters to conceive 
of the people as heterogeneous (Zhu 1997: 92). As a result, 
issues not immediately conducive to the nationalist cause such 
as gender, race, and class are conspicuously absent from their 
discourses about the nation state. Class, in particular, is 
banished to the farthest margins f  I don’t know why Xiao Ma, 
who wanted to be always in the dissident camp, no longer talks 
about class problems” [1997: 107]). This is why Marx 
emphasizes that "the nation attains existence as a notion, a 
fantasy, an illusion, a representation—as the represented nation 
. . .  cut off from the real nation” （Marx 1843: 69-70: qtd_ Sayer 
1991: 75). Such an institution is but “a collective 
misrepresentation of bourgeois society, whose real content 
remains the inequities of capitalism" (Sayer 1991: 83).
At the same time, the institutions that are involved in either 
maintaining or creating a nation state are constantly enlisting 
every possible technique of governmentality to promote the 
^primacy" of national identity and ensure an increasing degree of 
“transparency. Any excess has to be clearly accounted for and 
assimilated. This is why, according to the protagonist who is 
also the narrator, even President Li Denghui “has asked the
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government institutions concerned to study the ‘new human 
beings”’ （1997: 87). The famous writer and activist A, whom she 
interviews, also insists on clarifying <(how [she] identifies herself. 
Is she Taiwanese? Chinese? Taiwanese as well as Chinese? 
Chinese but living in Taiwan?” （1997: 97)
The protagonist is aware that Taiwan’s political and social 
movements—which bring the only hope of reform—have 
completely lost their bearings in their obsession with nationalism 
and ignored the worsening of the class situation in Taiwan (“We 
have become hereditary slaves without our knowing i f  [1997: 
106]). Precisely because of this, she turns nihilistic. From her 
perspective, the usual descriptions of the “new human beings” 
(as “consumerist” or “nihilistic”）are wide of the mark. The long 
list of their characteristics as put together by A is derived from 
hearsay accounts. Zhu Tianxin believes, on the contrary, that 
the real reason for the emergence of the “new human beings” is 
the further entrenchment of capitalism in contemporary society. 
Granted that postindustrial capitalism ’s much enhanced 
capability to produce desire definitely affects the consuming 
habits of the “new human beings,” their nihilistic tendencies 
probably have much more to do with the uneven distribution of 
wealth that they are confronted with after they graduate and 
begin working in the real world. According to the protagonist, it 
makes more sense to call them “new proletarians” or “new poor” 
rather than “new human beings,’ which has an air of chic-ness. 
Financially strapped, she is forced to become a “nomad” 
roaming the illegally constructed shacks on rooftops (1997: 94) 
and a “female slave” trapped in the professional world (1997: 
89). Given a social environment that is hopelessly uncongenial 
to reform, she can only seek her sense of security and belonging 
in a diamond. In other words, the spendthrift habits of the “new 
humans” in fact take shape ironically in response to their own 
financial strappedness.
Keenly aware of her status as a slave, the protagonist 
believes that she l,need[s] to possess a diamond in order to 
regain freedom” （1997: 89). But why is she so keen on 
possessing one since she obviously sees clearly that diamonds 
are nothing but hard and bright stones? While one may argue 
that the invincible brainwashing effects of the capitalist 
consumerist aesthetic might have weakened her resistance to
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the desires it produces, there is more to her wish for possession 
of the diamond. This could in fact be construed as an act of 
resistance to capitalist commercial fetishism through fetishism. 
The ability of diamonds to produce, with the help of light, a 
dreamlike atmosphere which resembles so much the power of 
capitalist dream-making is appropriated by her as a source of 
self-empowerment. If the diamond cannot give her real 
freedom, the effects it creates will at least make the small, bleak 
room in the basement she has rented look warmer: llMy 
Southern Star indeed brings an undescribable glamor to my 
basement” （1997: 108)_
Like The Mystery Garden, "Breakfast at Tiffany's" also 
ends with the presentation of a fetish. Further, both fetishes 
radiate floods of irresistible charm when placed under bright light 
(a symbol of “modernity” or “modernization”). But in 77?e /WysteAy 
Garden Zhu Yinghong in the end liberates the land" which is 
increasingly being commodified, while in “Breakfast at Tiffany’s” 
the protagonist brings home the fetish. To a certain extent, the 
different strategies employed reflect class differences. But there 
is one thing that the two works have in common: resistance 
against the “nationalization” of identity. The Mystery Garden 
returns the garden to the people in order to escape from the 
pillaging and plundering of capitalism carried out via the 
institution of the nation state. Seeing no way out, the 
protagonist in “Breakfast at Tiffany’s” opts to embrace the 
diamond like a moth darting undauntedly into a fire. But the 
illusions Zhu Yinghong has of the garden when she looks back 
wistfully at it—lit up by a huge number of fluorescent lights, so 
that “in the dark night，the whole garden looks [as if it were] 
engulfed in flames” （1997: 312)—seems to imply that Taiwan's 
further incorporation into late capitalism is ineluctable. In the 
case of “Breakfast at Tiffany’s,” unless the protagonist is 
equipped with the “double vision” of true postmodernity and the 
Baudrillardian will power “to be seduced endlessly，” her “Robin 
Hood-ian revenge" (1997: 103) on capitalism remains within the 
parameters of capitalism and is doomed to be futile.1 All things
11 Derrida's strategy of sous rature, through which we can cope 
with our limited existence in language with a “double vision,” is often 
invoked now when one talks about postmodernity. However, it is^  often
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considered, we can nevertheless argue that the resistances of 
both protagonists, predicated as they both are on a fatalistic 
vision, locate them among the most radical as well as clear­
sighted protests against the simulated trinity of the bourgeoisie, 
capitalism and the nation state.
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